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Abstract: While New Public Management is becoming an established program
for improving the quality of public administration, this study redirects our attention
to the merits of an older system. Some of the public administration mechanisms
that were reformed with the advent of democratization and globalization are
argued in this study to have worked better than their newer versions. Using the
Korean example, this study demonstrates that liberal political reforms may be
harmful for public management, contrary to the usual expectations about their
benefits. In the Korean bureaucracy, the disruption of deferred compensation—
attractive post-retirement employment as a reward for policy performance during
one’s tenure as a civil servant—impaired its organizational capacity, as policy
autonomy dropped and corruption increased within the bureaucracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Public administration researchers have recently focused on the reform programs
referred to as New Public Management (NPM). To reform existing public management
is assumed to be the only way to improve organizational capacity in public administra-
tion, whether the reforms aim at better governance or regulatory policy performance.
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Along with the neoliberal reforms in politics and the economy, NPM has been praised
by many studies as a solution for developing or underdeveloped countries, where the
performance of governments in providing public services tends to be lower than in
advanced countries.
The experiences of Korea do not exactly confirm the premise of NPM. Worse, in
some cases old programs prove to have been better than the new ones. Observations
for the past two decades suggest that the autonomy of a few government agencies
dropped and regulatory administration deteriorated. Problems including the increasing
financial scandals, corruption in public services, and policy incoherence confirm the
negative turn of Korea’s public management. Given the world’s appraisal of Korean
governmental capability up to the 1980s, the appearance of such negative terms as
organizational interests against national policy goals or policy indifference in the
newspapers is surprising to most watchers of Korea.
What has made Korea’s administrative reforms stagnate? Why isn’t Korea’s public
management improving itself in parallel with its political liberalization, as happened in
other democratizing countries? What undermined the organizational capacity of public
administration in some cases?
This article argues that some of Korea’s older, pre-reform public administration
mechanisms worked better than their newer versions. In particular, the disruption of
deferred compensation—a system of long-term rewards for policy performance in which
officials are employed in private or public firms (State Owned/Invested Corporations)
after retirement from government office—impaired its organizational capacity, reducing
policy autonomy and increasing corruption.
Democratization in Korea, according to this interpretation, hurt the deferred com-
pensation system in two ways. First, it decreased the absolute number of jobs offered
to retiring civil servants under the public pressure for further liberalization. The pressure
was realized in the economic sector with the demand for breaking the link between the
government and private businesses. Bureaucrats in economic ministries were pressed
to refrain from seeking nak-ha-san (literally translated as parachute—appointment to a
public firm) or a post-retirement job in the private sector. Second, political elites who
were less vulnerable to public pressure took over from the bureaucrats as the benefi-
ciaries of the nak-ha-san system. Bureaucrats bore the sole burden of sacrifice as
Korea’s public administration adjusted to political liberalization.
As deferred compensation was disrupted and incentives for policy performance
decreased as a consequence, the negative effects were obvious. The political-bureau-
cratic collusions for rents are a prime example. Collusion began with the reliance of
bureaucrats on key political figures for deferred compensation as this benefit became
harder to get. The new political elites who rose to the center of Korean politics after
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democratization were swayed by the rising regionalism and in return pushed the
bureaucrats to ally with the hegemonic regional powers for promotions and other 
benefits like post-retirement jobs. While the room for corruption was expanding in this
way, the independence of government agencies from political interests was seriously
reduced. Korea’s successful introduction of political democracy turned to be counter-
productive for the organizational capacity of the government.
An implication of this study for further debates on the effectiveness of administrative
reforms is to reappraise the crucial role of culture in determining the success or failure
of reforms. The best point of the old system of deferred compensation is obviously the
high performance of public administration, but the unique point of the system is the
hidden nature of the institutional commitment to long-term rewards. As the cultural
factor of network-based commitment was essential for the success of the old system, a
successful administrative reform should also consider the social and cultural backdrop
to the reform. More often than not, deep-rooted cultural conditions can limit or prevent
the fulfillment of institutional goals. As the empirical part of this paper describes, the
Confucian type of social interactions propped up the system of deferred compensation.
The effects of the institutional reforms later on, on the other hand, are less impressive
than those of the old system. Analysis of the old system suggests that the reforms’ 
relative lack of success has a lot to do with the incompatibility between the new insti-
tutional imperatives and the given social norms.
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION IN KOREA
Studies of administrative reforms in the vein of NPM investigate the reform pro-
grams from three angles that are common in social science research. The first group
focuses on inputs, asking what kinds of reforms should be considered. The reforms
may entail a new structure, institution, or environment for public administration. In the
structural studies, the usual concern about the agent-principle relationship focuses on
whether or how to seek the autonomy of an agent in charge of a certain type of task
(Yesikagit & Christensen, 2009; Miller, 2005). Institutional studies explore the proper
composition of institutions by testing whether a crucial institution is missing or there
are any coordination problems (Orrnert, 2006). External conditions of public adminis-
tration are also an important component of input. Rapid social, political, or economic
changes have serious effects on the performance of public agencies. Democratization
studies in the field of public governance are an example (Adsera, 2003; Moran, 2001).
Studies that focus on outputs specialize in measurement. Since the effects of
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administrative reforms appear in various forms, these studies focus on identifying 
the effects and choosing the best way to measure them. Capacity for public administra-
tion is, therefore, defined and measured in many ways, while efficiency in regulatory
governance and autonomy are the leading indicators of capacity (Christensen & Gazley,
2008). In NPM studies, attention has been paid to whether or how the reform improves
capacity. The effects tend to be case-dependent even if NPM in general hypothesizes a
positive effect of the administrative reforms (Painter & Yee, 2011).
Finally, a few studies delve into the context or process whereby the inputs affect
the outcomes. The rationale for the concern about context is found in the diverse effects
of a single type of administrative reform (Rouban, 2007; Kuhlmann, 2010). Path-
dependence or cultural backgrounds are representative of the contextual denominators
of success or failure in the reforms.
The theoretical advancements in the NPM debates have also been applied to the case
of Korea. The personnel system in Korea’s public administration, for instance, has been
reviewed in terms of the effects of reform in the area of political appointments or other
systems for promoting high-ranking officials (Kim, 2004). Related to the systemic
reforms and their effects, the unique aspects of the Korean factors were investigated
together. The Open Position System adopted in 1999, for instance, had only limited 
success due to the lingering social preferences for seniority and networks over perfor-
mance. The scheme to open the higher positions in the government to the private sector
as well as internal competitors failed to recruit competent candidates from outside the
government. Another attempt to revise the personnel system for high-ranking officials,
made in 2002, was the Personnel Exchange System, which allowed middle managers in
the civil service to take a leave of absence to experience working in a private firm. The
reform was also intended to break down the monopoly over public administration by
civil servants, but it was as unsuccessful as the Open Position System had been in
exchanging human resources between the public and private sectors.
More disappointing in terms of the effects, however, was the reform of the payment
system, where a move toward performance-based pay was tried. The plan to overhaul
the seniority-based collective evaluation for compensation proved a complete failure
when it was revealed that most awardees for better performance later returned the
money to the bureau to be redistributed equally to everybody (Park & Joo, 2010).
While the NPM studies explore the effects of reform in the narrow time span of
two decades or so, political economy studies look at public administration from the
wider perspective of Korea’s economic development. These studies fill in elements
missing from the NPM studies by highlighting the background of the reforms—that is,
explaining why the Korean public administration needed a reform from its previous
performance throughout the most period of economic growth. First, some scholars
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focused on corruption. Constraints to rent seeking, though efficient in the past, were
lifted during Korea’s economic transition. Politicians and private businesses played
into the hand of rent, but bureaucrats in economic ministries could also jump on the
bandwagon using many discretionary regulatory tools. David Kang referred to this
increasing corruption as “crony capitalism.” Close ties between the state and business,
according to his view, are conducive to rent seeking, even if they can be controlled in
exceptional cases. But once the mechanism to prevent excessive exploitation broke, as
it did in Korea during the 1990s, the structural path of cronyism immediately resumed
(Kang, 2002).
The other group of studies focused on bureaucratic networks. Economic bureaucrats
belong to dense policy networks as well as working individually to execute policy.
Various networks have been formed through policy interaction and personnel transfer
for decades, and have affected each economic policy through layers of connections
and coordination. This thick web of networks restricted economic bureaucrats’ choices
of policies against their organizational interests or policy clients.
Differently put, network interests were embedded in every bureaucratic choice of
policy. When the economic structure needed to be completely overhauled to be com-
petitive in the global economy, the networks began to work as powerful interest
groups to protect their own interests and ensure that they would benefit from the
reform or at least minimize their losses. In this model, bureaucrats, incumbent or
retired (and rehired in positions outside government), formed strong institutional
obstacles to full deregulation, which resulted in selective deregulation only in areas 
of minimal bureaucratic cost. Jennifer Amyx (2006) developed this logic in her expla-
nation of Japan’s drag on financial reform.
The two groups share two characteristics. First, corruption and networks both high-
lighted the negative effects of bureaucracy in globalization. Benefits of bureaucratic
intervention, even when they existed, were much smaller than its cost. It is not merely
that these models were developed to account for troubled East Asian economies during
the 1990s. They presupposed that bureaucracy was a structural obstacle to economic
performance under the other given conditions of East Asian economies. It was a sharp
turn from the traditional understanding of the developmental state where bureaucracy
was a structural support for rapid growth. We can hardly expect a theoretical continuum
from such opposite standpoints. Second, they have only limited coverage of empirical
cases. Democratization and human networks were set as preconditions by the two 
theories, which narrowed their focus to formerly authoritarian countries and homoge-
nous societies (in terms of elite behavior) respectively.
This study overcomes the disadvantages of the disjunction between political 
economic studies and NPM studies through a retrospective interpretation of the old
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public administration. The old system is evaluated as individually selfish but collectively
virtuous with the help of the culturally embedded system of deferred compensation. If
the construction of the system in an early stage of economic development was a positive
reform for government performance, its deterioration later prohibits any administrative
reform thereafter from achieving its supposed goals. Since the negative turn of public
administration during the 1990s was driven by the external factor of democratization,
only a framework that combines political economy and public administration can 
provide a full description of Korea’s experiences.
DEFERRED COMPENSATION AND THE CAPACITY 
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Among many aspects of public administration, this study focuses on the compensa-
tion system. The high capacity of the Korean public administration throughout the
period of rapid economic growth, praised in the name of Weberian bureaucracy, was
contingent on the construction of a good compensation system. The downturn 
in capacity has a lot to do with trouble in the compensation system. The analytical
redirection of Korea’s public administration rejects sociopolitical interpretations, as
other studies do (Evans, 1995). Social supports for performance (in the sense that they
had existed before the economic takeoff), such as meritocratic (merit-based) recruitment
and lifetime employment, held constant during the 1990s, yet the seemingly corporate-
minded and professional bureaucracy disappeared during the same period and thereby
lowered the capacity of public administration seriously. Instead, deferred compensation
—post-retirement job opportunities for retiring economic bureaucrats—is proposed as
the determinant of the capacity.
The interpretation of the performance of Korea’s public administration as motivated
by material compensations first assumes a rational bureaucracy. Korean bureaucrats
are as rational, and thus motivated by material incentives, as those in any other country.
Compensation for performance, however, is hidden from outsiders behind the formal
institutions of personnel management. In outsiders’ eyes, Korean civil servants are
simply “corporate-coherent” in the ideal type of Weberian bureaucracy.1 The actual
process, on the other hand, worked as follows for decades: Korean bureaucrats were
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1. Scholars defined the ideal type of bureaucracy suggested by Max Weber in various ways. In
this study, I selected two key factors relevant to East Asian political economies as most
leading studies in the field adopted. They are professionalism based on a tenured career and
public-mindedness preserved by rule observations and job descriptions (Evans, 1995: 34-5).
undercompensated for their work in the government, but as they retired they sought
second careers in public or private firms that paid much better than their government
jobs. Over time, this pattern became thoroughly institutionalized. The prospect of later
compensation in the private sector enabled bureaucrats to endure the austerity of their
government careers and provided a compelling incentive for excellence in bureaucratic
performance.2
A simple market analogy is helpful to understand this mechanism. It turns on the
supply, demand, and brokerage of retiring economic bureaucrats. The three players are
economic ministries, private firms, and public firms (bureaucratic “old boys” in the
sense that they were former colleagues of the incumbent bureaucrats). The government
supplies candidates for reemployment in the market whenever it needs to discharge
staff from the promotion pyramid. Economic ministries make the best use of the reem-
ployment market as a solution to their promotion bottleneck, although in a few cases it
is used for rewarding retiring top officials with lucrative private jobs.
On the other side, private businesses covet the information and government connec-
tions bureaucrats bring with them when they retire, so they constitute the major source
of demand. Public firms still function as brokers in this system, standing as they do
between the government and private firms. The Law of Public Service Ethics facilitates
such brokerage by restricting retiring bureaucrats, and top officials in particular, from
moving directly to private firms in their policy specialty and jurisdiction (Hankyoreh
Shinmun, December 14, 2001, and April 24, 2001). Top bureaucrats, in deference to
this law, conventionally take a position as the head of a public firm first, and then
transfer to a private firm if and when a position becomes available. Various industrial
and business associations, whose top managerial positions have customarily been
taken by retiring top government officials, can also function as brokers of a sort. They
work together to deliver retiring bureaucrats to private firms after employing the new
retirees for a while (figure 1).
Under the triangular relationship structure of the deferred compensation system,
individual recruitments are largely removed from the hands of job candidates or
employers, falling instead to job brokers. While going through the brokering process,
the terms of the trade between employers and employees (for example, information
and connections for post-retirement jobs, represented as curved lines in figure 1) blur
significantly because the brokers are far less interested in the specific needs of either
side than they are in showing their muscle in the trade. As a result, rents that otherwise
would have been created by a direct deal between economic ministries and private
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2. A prime example of this practice is Japan’s amakudari system. See, for instance, Calder
(1989) and Schaede (1995).
firms transform themselves into “goodwill” assistance on the part of private business-
es to increase the compensation of government officials.
In practice, bureaucratic elites have been systematically transferred to public and
private firms since Korea’s economic takeoff, transforming themselves into business
elites.3 The transfer of economic bureaucrats was even more institutionalized. Two
statistical data substantiate this institutionalization. First, the amount of transfer was
massive. Governmental officials who sought second careers, including military officers
(mostly generals) who temporarily took government positions before moving into
business firms, numbered as many as 955 for the period of 1960-2000. That number
covers only high managerial positions in the firms, that is, managing directors and
above. The number significantly increases if lower-level managers are included. Second,
economic bureaucrats were best positioned to exploit the opportunities provided by
elite transfer. Major economic agencies—the Economic Planning Board, Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and Ministry of Construction—provided
almost 50 percent of the total cases of reemployment, although economic bureaucrats
comprised less than a quarter of the total civil service (table 1).4
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3. Insofar as top bureaucrats are concerned, this point constitutes a striking difference
between the Korean system and its Japanese counterpart. In Japan, retiring bureaucrats
could choose one of three post-retirement careers: politics (seikai tensin), private firms
(amakudari), and public firms (yokosubery). Sometimes they could go to private firms via
public firms, often called wataridori. In Korea, the wataridori-style two-step moves were
institutionalized and practiced up until the whole deferred system was destabilized toward
the end of the 1990s. For the Japanese case, see Colignon and Usui (2003, pp. 7-14).
4. Journalists coined the term MOFIA, a combination of MOFE (revised in 1995 from the
MOF by adding Economy at the end) and Mafia, to express the enormous and monopolistic
power of the economic ministries.
Figure 1. Deferred Compensation under the Old System
a = information and connections; b = deferred compensation
Democratization wipes out the brokers from the reemployment market by demolish-
ing the bureaucratic policy networks. This occurs in two ways. First, democratization
increases opportunities for the promotion from within the firm, filling up positions in
public firms that might otherwise have been taken by retiring bureaucrats. High public
demand for change under rapid democratization translates to economic decentralization,
which includes breaking the practice of nak-ha-san. Second, democratization changes
the composition of managers in public firms. While military generals and economic
bureaucrats were primary candidates before, political liberalization expels the military
from the market and instead brings political elites in. The new system is described in
figure 2.
The upshot of the systemic change driven by democratization is an overall destabi-
lization of deferred compensation—both a quantitative decrease and a qualitative deteri-
oration. The pie (absolute number of post-retirement jobs) shrinks due to public pressure
for economic decentralization. Political interference in policy networks is even more
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Figure 2. Deferred Compensation after Democratization
A = policy favors; B = rents
Table 1. Deferred Compensation in number, 1960-2000
Economic Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of Economic Government Planning Finance Commerce Construction ministries totalBoard and Industry total
1960s 10 (7) 22 (16) 11 (8) 4 (3) 47 (34) 138 (100)
1970s 22 (11) 45 (23) 34 (17) 6 (3) 107 (54) 198 (100)
1980s 35 (13) 49 (18) 38 (14) 19 (7) 137 (50) 274 (100)
1990s 46 (13) 56 (16) 45 (13) 21 (6) 168 (49) 345 (100)
Total 109 (11) 172 (18) 128 (13) 50 (5) 459 (48) 955 (100)
Source: Calculated from data from Who’s Who, various issues, published by Yunhap News, Joong-ang Ilbo, and Chosun
Ilbo.
Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of the government total.
detrimental. Career politicians after democratization are more like “new kids on the
block” and less associated with bureaucrats than the withdrawing military generals. The
resultant heterogeneity within policy networks increases uncertainty in job brokerage by
bureaucratic “old boys” for the newly retiring bureaucrats. The expectation of a
gloomy financial future leads to the institutional degeneration of the entire bureaucracy.
In a sharp contrast to policy efficiency and autonomy supported by a stable system of
deferred compensation, policy indifference and corruption (as a means of self-help)
bloomed with the disruption of the reemployment market. Lack of policy coordination
and poor monitoring are only some of the examples.
The negative effects were obvious in the quantity and quality of deferred compen-
sation. When Korea’s political regime went through rapid liberalization, the increasing
public pressure for economic decentralization (breakup of Korea’s elite-dominated
political economy) curtailed the absolute size of elite transfer. NGOs and other social
activist groups blamed economic ministries for facilitating economic monopoly in
Korea, which was in turn perceived to be enabled through cooperation by ex-bureaucrats
working in public or private firms.
Both absolute and relative downsizing occurred during the 1990s (table 2). First,
post-retirement jobs became more competitive, as seen in the decreasing ratio of reem-
ployment among retirees from 26 percent to 20 percent. Second, the age of retirement
steadily rose from 40 to 55 through the four decades, meaning that compensations
from second careers shrank as bureaucratic retirees were left with fewer years in
which to earn high (private-sector) salaries. In addition, the chance to obtain a private
job, either immediately after government service or after years of service in a public
firm, dropped from 83-87 percent in previous decades to 68 percent in the 1990s. This
also harmed retiring bureaucrats, given that salaries are generally higher at private
firms than at public firms.
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Table 2. Deferred Compensation before and after Democratization
Post-retirement Reemployment Retirement Probability of 
jobs (A) Retirees (B) ratio (A/B) age post-retirement employment
1960s 47 284 17% 40.3 0.87
1970s 107 509 21% 46.6 0.87
1980s 137 533 26% 52.0 0.83
1990s 168 820 20% 54.9 0.68
Source: Yunhap News, Who’s Who, various issues, Korea Institute of Public Administration, Statistics, various parts.
This table is based on the same data set as table 1. The numbers of retirees were calculated based on the acceptance of
High Civil Service Exam for the 10 years when these retiring bureaucrats first entered the government. The entry years, in
turn, were traced using the retirement ages and the median age of all exam passers during these years.
The effects of the decreasing compensation were evident in the evaluations of 
government capacity by the media and even by top political leaders. Such pejorative
terms as policy indifference (bok-ji-bu-dong) and organizational self-interest (bu-
chuh-e-gi-ju-eh) described the Korean bureaucrats who had been widely praised only
years earlier by international observers. The cases of nonperforming public administra-
tion were countless, regardless of the field of regulation or policy oversight.
LINGERING CONCERN ABOUT DEFERRED 
COMPENSATION AND LIMITTED SUCCESS IN THE 
LATER ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
The downsizing of deferred compensation and the decreasing motivation for policy
performance as a consequence have diminished the capacity of Korea’s public administra-
tion in the new millennium. Administrative reforms to improve government performance
ever since have been similarly stagnated, as the civil servants were more interested in
their future compensation than in the benefits from other kinds of institutional reforms.
Several facts regarding post-retirement activities during these days are suggestive of
the continuing but deteriorated practice of personnel transfers from the government to
private firms.
The keen interest of civil servants, economic bureaucrats in particular, in post-
retirement careers is perennial. The stories about the organizational supports for reem-
ployment within the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) are a good example. The
Congressional Hearing Reports of 2008 indicate that as many as 32 middle- or high-
level directors (second level and higher) sought post-retirement jobs in the private sector.
The mere number of the transfers, however, is less impressive than the way civil servants
manipulated their positions a year or less before they retired. Of the 32 reemployed
FSS members, 26 (81.2 percent) are reported to have moved to bureaus that were
promising for reemployment, such as human resources, consumer protection, and
inspection support, immediately before they retired. The report also says that 10 of
them actually served less than three months before they took a job in private business
(Joongang Ilbo, October 13, 2008). An official report from the Ministry of Public
Administration and Security gives a smaller number of transfers, 19, but confirms that
economic ministries like the FSS (19) and the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy
(MKE) (7) have a much larger presence in the reemployment market than the National
Intelligence Service (8), Ministry of National Defense (6), or Supreme Prosecutors’
Office (5) (Yonhap News, October 2, 2008).
Among the most promising employers for retiring bureaucrats in recent years have
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been private law firms. In the five years ending May 18, 2011, they hired 85 government
retirees. Former economic bureaucrats took the lion’s share of the jobs, 53 or 62 percent.
The Fair Trade Commission had the highest number with 19 reemployments, followed
by the FSS, the National Tax Service, and the Korea Customs Service (Citizens’ Coali-
tion for Economic Justice, 2011).
There was a surge of transfers from the government to private law firms immediately
before a revision of the Law of Public Service Ethics went into effect. The revision is
taken by most bureaucrats to have negative implications for their futures, because it
increases the required wait after retirement before moving to a private firm in the same
policy area from two to five years and widens the range of ranks required to report their
personal assets from the second to fourth level and above. It is not surprising from the
standpoint of deferred compensation that civil servants, regardless of rank, rushed for
honorary retirement to avoid these legal restrictions. The Financial Supervisory Service
lost 28 members within a month immediately before the new law went into effect
(Seoul Daily, October 28, 2011).
Complaints about the law were reported as early as 2008, when it was first enacted
in Congress. A director of a bureau in the Ministry of Strategy and Finance said, “It
would be much better to retire now than later…. Is it really a good policy to lower the
morale of civil servants like this?” In response, a bureau manager of the Ministry of
Public Administration and Safety, which initiated the proposal, defended it by saying:
Other countries like Japan, Germany and France do not allow seeking a post-
retirement job in private firms at all…. We need to build people’s trust in public
services by adopting the advanced systems even if civil servants have to sacrifice
their interests somewhat. (Hankyoreh, September 2, 2008)
The use of words like “morale” and “sacrifice” unintentionally admits that the system
of deferred compensation has provided significant incentives for job performance
while in the government, and that to lose those opportunities would be a big sacrifice
for civil servants.
On the other hand, the ways that the post-retirement job transfers have been modified
indicate that the benefits are neither as attractive to individual bureaucrats nor as positive
for the public interest as before. Since the political elites became greater beneficiaries
of the nak-ha-san system than bureaucrats through Korea’s democratization in the
1990s, the dependence of civil servants on political leadership to increase their chance
of a post-government job has continued or deepened. Similar stories have repeatedly
appeared in media reports about new hires for the positions of directors and inspectors
in public firms whenever the time for renewal (mostly seasonal) approached. High-
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ranking government officials compete among themselves and lobby for the positions
to politicians of influence, while competing with political elites like lawmakers and
their aides at the same time. Some post-retirement jobs were reserved exclusively for
bureaucrats in the past, as described in the previous section, but the monopoly was
broken as early as in the 1990s. Hence the competition for the limited jobs for bureau-
crats is becoming harsher.
For instance, almost all Korean newspapers published stories about nak-ha-san in
February 2011 when up to 135 managerial positions in public firms were expected to
open soon. The candidates, the newspapers predicted, would include former lawmakers,
retiring bureaucrats, and the participants in the presidential election campaign. The
papers also frequently pointed out that the MKE was under the heaviest external pres-
sure to take care of somebody for a certain position, since the ministry holds the most
public or subsidiary firms under its jurisdiction of all the government agencies. More
importantly, the reports agreed that the authority for making the final decisions was held
by Yong-jun Park, the MKE vice minister appointed by the president. He was merely a
political appointee without a professional job specialty, but was more influential than
any professional bureaucrats within the ministry insofar as personnel matters were
concerned. The power shift was made during Korea’s democratization, as previously
mentioned. As a result, even MKE members needed Park’s permission to have a
chance for a position in a public firm in which the ministry controlled the management.
It was a matter of course that MKE candidates had to compete for Park’s approval
with the candidates from other government agencies and also the members of political
parties (Donga Ilbo, February 2, 2011).
A serious cost of the increased political power over personnel decisions in public
firms is the policy dependence of government agencies on political interests. In con-
sideration of their future careers, economic bureaucrats have to listen to what political
leaders want in either regulatory or budget policies. In that regard, the policy autonomy
of government agencies is seriously impaired, as is the capacity of public administra-
tion insofar as the capacity has to do with autonomy. The political domination of the
personnel administration of civil servants is, therefore, counterproductive to public
administration because it prioritizes compensation issues over other policy concerns.
Finally, the temptation to corruption, or technically rent-seeking, driven by the
declining opportunities for reemployment by private firms, often nullified the efforts
to improve government capability through administrative reforms. The studies on
Korean administrative reforms from the NPM viewpoint have confirmed that the
reforms were not very successful. The relevance of deferred compensation to the
administrative reforms was found in the efforts of individual bureaucrats to marginalize
the public goals of the reforms in the face of their private goals of securing post-
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retirement lives.
For instance, the Open Position System, the administrative reform that sought to
ensure that the most qualified people would be found for the highest positions in 
government agencies, failed when it was abused to enable the rehiring of ex-bureaucrats.
Job descriptions were often tailored to fit a member of the inner circle. Unless the
retiring bureaucrats were able to expect sufficient compensation from an outside source,
their desire for compensation resulted in their collusion to seek internal compensation
through, for example, rehiring by the government. Other reforms, such as the launch of
the Personnel Exchange System, similarly fell victim to the search for better compen-
sation by civil servants. Instead of using the time to learn from private experiences for
better policy execution, as the reform originally intended, participants in the program
used the opportunity more for building connections with the private firms to which
they were assigned, to give them a better chance for a potential job in the future.
In the same vein, the involvement of a director in the Financial Service Commission
(FSC) in the recent scandal about savings banks can be interpreted from the viewpoint
of shrinking deferred compensation and the resulting corruption (Maeil Kyungje, July
12, 2012). His acceptance of money in return for dropping a savings bank from the
bankruptcy list, if it turns out to be true, is most likely to be the tip of an iceberg of
tacit trades between the FSC and financial intermediaries surrounding policy favors
and reemployment. If the established system of deferred compensation declines, all
the incentives to work for public goals decline with it, resulting in self-reliance in the
search for further compensation other than government salaries.
The concern is durable enough to survive any institutional reconstruction intended
to better serve public administration. In this case, the establishment of the FSC in 2008
confirms this expectation in that it was built to increase the efficiency of financial
monitoring by combining the mission of the FSS with the financial planning of the old
Ministry of Finance and Economy, but the concerns about future jobs diminished the
original institutional goals. No matter what reforms are developed to improve the
capacity of public administration, individual civil servants’ interest in compensation
will put a brake on the effort unless the past system of deferred compensation is
revived. In sum, government incapacity due to insufficient compensation and resulting
corruption can only be improved through reforms of the personnel and payment systems.
CONCLUSION
The Korean government has launched various efforts to reform public management
ever since the political and economic reforms of the 1990s. The results, however, have
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not been as successful as many New Public Management scholars expected. This
study raises the possibility that the unsatisfactory outcomes are due to the unexpected
changes made in public administration with the advent of Korea’s democratization.
Among others, the overhaul of the hidden compensation system for bureaucrats has
been the most detrimental. Once it changed the attitudes of Korean bureaucrats, the
administrative reforms that followed have had only limited effects in improving public
management in Korea.
A new payment system, for example performance-based compensation, may be a
good alternative, but it is not easy to achieve. As interpreted in this paper, the old system
of deferred compensation reflected the Korean culture’s consideration of government
jobs as a service to society regardless of their compensation. A performance-based
system would call for a revision of attitudes toward public service to consider it more
like private employment, in which payments are made depending on the performance
or qualifications of individual workers. A comprehensive pay raise to bring government
salaries more in line with private-sector salaries may be another solution to the com-
plaint about compensation in general. But there would still be a need for a mechanism
to boost competition for job performance within an agency or department—unless the
salary gap between the ranks is wide enough to attract such an internal competition as
witnessed in Korea under the deferred compensation system.
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